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Outlines of the Development of the Legal Philosophical 
Thought in Hungary
(From the Beginnings to the World War II)
The traditions of Hungárián legal philosophy followed the various periods of 
the Continental legal philosophical thinking until the mid-20th century. The 
oeuvres o f the most significant legal philosophers are nőt restncted to the 
interpretation o f the achievements of the more developed legal cultures, bút 
are alsó reflected in independent theoretical efforts.1
1 See from the literature on the subject o f  history o f  Hungárián legal philosophv: Tivadar 
PAULHR, Bevezetés az észjogtanba [Introduction to natural law], Pest, 1852; Rudolf W líRNIiR, A
bölcsészeti jogtudomány történelme. Kiegészítésül Schilling természetjogi művéhez [History o f  law 
philosophy. A(3dition to Schilling’s book o f natural law], Budapest, Franklin Társulat, 1875; 
Tivadar PAULER, Adalékok a hazai jogtudomány történetéhez [Contributions to the history o f 
Hungárián jurisprudence], Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia 1878; Félix SOMLÓ, Die 
neuere ungarische Kechtsphilosophie, Archiv für Rechts- und W irtschaftsphilosophie, 1 (1907-08) 
315-323; Ferenc FlNKEY, A  tételes jog alapéivá és vezéreszméi. Bevezetés és a jogbölcsészet kifejlődésének 
története (The principles and ideas o f  positive law. Introduction to the the history o f  legal 
philosophy], Budapest, Grill Károly Könyvkiadóvállalata, 1908; Barna HORVÁTH, Die ungarische 
Rechtsphilosophie, Archiv für Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie, 34 (1930-31/1), 37-85; Imre 
SZABÓ, A  burzsoá állam- és jogbölcselet Magyarországon [The bourgeois philosophy o f  law and state 
in Hungary^], Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 1955, 19802; LOSS , SZABADTA] .VI , SZABÓ, 
SZILÁGYI, ZÖ D I, Portrévázlatok a magyar jogbölcseleti gondolkodás történetéből [Portray's from the 
history' o f  legal philosophy in Hungary], Miskolc, Bíbor Kiadó, 1995; Csaba VARGA, Philosophy 
oj Eaw in Central and Eastern Europe: A  Sketch of History, Acta Juridica Hungarica, 41 (2000/1-2), 
17-25; József SZABADFALVI, Transition and Tradition. Can Hungárián Traditions of Eegal Philosoply 
Contribute to Eegal Transition?, Rechtstheorie, 33 (2002/2-4), 167-170; SZABADFALVI, Kevaluation 
oj Hungárián Eegal Philosophical Tradition, Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie (ARSP), 89 
(2003/2), 159-170; SZABADFALVI, Neo-Kantian Eegal Philosophical Thinking in Hungary, 3"bopHiiK 
PavoBa /  Recueil des Travaux (Növi Sad) 37 (2003) 1-2, 271-281; SZABADFALVI, The Spint of 
the Common Eaw in the Hungárián Eegal Philosophical Thinking, HJEAS: Hungárián Journal of 
English and American Studies, 9 (2003/2), 199-208; SZABADFALVI, Short History o f Eegal 
Philosophical Thinking in Hungary until the Mid-Twentieth Century, Acta Iuridica Cassoviensia - 
Untverzita P. J. Safárika v Kosiciach - Právnická Fakulta) 25 (2004), 36-45; SZABADFALVI, The 
Role o f the Hungárián Eegal Philosophical Tradition in the Kenewal of National Eegal Culture — Právná 
kultúra a európsky integracnv proces (historické, politicko-právne a filozofické aspekty práva a
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1. Developments of the end of the Middle Ages
When tiying to find the earliest documents in Hungárián legal philosophy, \ve 
must trace back to the end of the Middle Ages and the early new age. A proof 
of natural law doctrine in the Middle Ages is Tripartitum (1517) by István 
Werbőczy (1458—1541), comprising „the law of the country”, which describes 
in its prologue the concepts of justice, law and its divisions as well as the 
different types o f statutes in a theoredcal way.2 That book was issued in more 
than five dozen publications including abridged and popular ones; however, 
there is still ven- litde known about the origins of the legal knowledge of the 
author, who created the most important work fór determining Hungárián legal 
atütude and legal culture up to the mid-19th century. l ’he only fact that can be 
proven is that he spent one semester at the University of Krakow in the last 
decade o f the 15,h centun- and he acquired his language command o f Latin, 
Greek and Germán in church schools. No document has emerged describmg 
his Western-European (Italian) study trip. His philosophical and theological 
atumde is basically characterized by the adoption o f the scholasüc naairal law 
discipline of the Middle Ages originaüng from Greek-Roman traditions; 
nevertheless, the ideas elaborated in his main opus do nőt constitute a single, 
coherent natural law doctrine.
Directio metbodica,3 published a century la tér (in 1619) by János Kitonich 
(1561-1619), was a collection o f contemporary criminal proceedings. Stmilarly 
to Werbőczy, this collection drew on Román law sources and cited works by 
Cicero, Gellius, Ovidius, Livius and Varró. In that age it was nőt without
pravnej kultury)/ Law Culture and European Integration Process (historical, politicaLlegal and 
philosophical aspects o f  law and legal culture) Zborník vedeckvch prác riesitel’ov projektu 
VEGA  a konferencnych príspevkov úcastníkov vedeckej konferencie „Právna kultúra a 
európsky integracny proces” ed. Jan ClPKAR (Kosice: Právnická Fakulta UPJS v  Kosiciach) 
2004) 236-248; SZABADFALVI, A  cselekvőségi elmélettől a~ üjreaügmusig (From the theory o f 
freedom o f action to new realism], Budapest, G ondolat Kiadó -  Debreceni Egyetem, 2004); 
Andreas FUNKE, Allgemeine Rechtslebre ats juristiscbe Strukturtbeoir: Entwicklung und gegenwártige 
Bedeutung dér Recbtstbeorie um 1900, Tübmgen, M ohr Siebeck, 2004; András JAKAB, 
Neukantianismus in dér ungariscben Recbtstbeorie in dér ersten Hátfte des X X . Jabrbuderts, Archiv fúr 
Rechts- und Sozialphilosophíe (ARSP), 94 (2008/2), 264-272; Csaba VARGA, Philosophy sing on 
Lmw in the 'Tunnod o f Communist Take-over in Hungary (Tivo Portraits, Interwar and Post-war) = The 
2005 ALPSA Annual Publication o f  the Australian Legal Philosophy Students Association, ed. 
Max LliSZKlliWICZ, Brisbane, 2005, 82-94; SZABADFALVI, A  magyar jogbölcseleti gondolkodás 
kegdetei [The beginnings o f  Hungárián Legal Philosophical Thinking], Debreceni Szemle, 16 
(2008/4) 468-480.
2 István WERBŐCZY, Tripartitum opusjuris consuetuditiarii regni Hungáriáé, Viennae, 1517.
3 János KITONICH, Directio metbodica processus iudiciarii juris consuetudinarii inclyti regni Hungáriáé, 
Tyrnaviae, 1619.
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precedent that authors of Román or even Justinian law were cited as sources in 
adjudicaüng legal disputes.
An important instituüonal transformation occurred in the history of 
Hungárián legal philosophical thinking with the estabhshment o f the University 
o f Nagyszombat (Trnava) with its faculties of theology and árts in 1635, and 
the addition of a faculty of law (facultas juridica) in 1667. While earlier 
attempts to estabhsh universities had nőt mfluenced legal phüosophy in any 
way, education in the first legal institution of higher educadon had a strong 
influence on the further progress in legal thinking. Pracdcal aspects were 
emphasized when the faculty and its structure o f instrucdon were launched. 
The founders did nőt follow either the Western-European or even the Austrian 
example; rather, their primaty aim was to meet the pracdcal needs o f the 
Hungárián world of law. Two of the four professors of the faculty lectured in 
„nadonal” law (jus patrium), while the other two professors held lectures in 
Canon law and Román law.4 In Hungárián higher legal education the traditions 
of theoretical education as part o f Román law and practice-oriented had been 
combined before the reforms of Enlightened absolutism emerged. The 
teachmg of natural law doctrines mosdy depended on the professors’ free will. 
Consequently, it was merelv bv chance that generations o f lawyers were nőt 
provided with legal philosophical knowledge.
A good example of interpreting natural law doctrines was a work 
published in 1640 by György Illyésházy (1625—1689),3 a three-volume work 
discussing natural law by Márton Szentiványi (1633—1705)/’ an essay on natural 
law published in 1694 by András Lehotay (?—1734). Somé tirne later, however, 
Lehotay’s former colleague László István Ivregár (?—?) described that éra in his 
own lectures in natural law, saying that it is „a dictate o f reason originating 
from God which orders everything that is good from inwards and prohibits 
everything that is evil.”* All this reflects the decisive feature of scholastic 
natural law thought.
4 Tivadar PAUl.HR, Adalékok a ha^ai jogtudomány történetébep [Contributions to the history of 
Hungárián jurisprudence], Budapest, Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1878, 1-2; Tivadar 
PAUl.HR, A  budapesti Magyar Kir. Tudomány-egyetem története [History o f  Hungárián royal 
university^], Budapest, Magyar Királyi Egyetemi Könyvnyomda, 1880, 22-23.
3 György' Il.LYHSUA/.Y, Disputatio de iustitia originah, Trenchinii, 1640.
6 Márton SZENTIVÁNYI, Curiosiora et selediora variarum scientiarum miscellanea I-III., Tyrnaviae, 
1689-1709.
' A n d rá s  L hi-IOTAY, Dissertatio iuridica de statu hominum, consistente primo in libertate, et buic opposita 
servitude, 1694.
* István László KRHGÁR, Tractatus theoreticopracticus in tripartitum juris Hungária decretum, Tyrnavie, 
1749.
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2. Developments in the 18,h century
The compulsory and mdisputable cornerstone fór those times, considering its 
theoretical basis, was the doctrine elaborated in Hugó Grotius’s (1583-1645) 
work De jure belli acpaás (1625). Legal philosophy as an independent discipline 
was established through a legal concept, which was on its way to becoming free 
of Christian theology, and which originated natural law doctrines from humán 
natúré. The doctrines of Grotius became fruitful in the contemporary Germán 
philosophy of law from the second half of the 17th century. Among the 
distinguished figures of the rationalistic explanation of namral law were Sámuel 
Pufendorf (1632-1694), Christian Thomasius (1655-1728), and Christian 
W olff (1679-1754), considered the most reputable follower of the 
philosophical and legal concepts o f Leibnitz, all o f whom deserve mention fór 
having exerted the greatest mfluence on the evolution o f Hungárián legal 
philosophy. As jurists and university professors, they estabhshed and practised 
namral law as an independent legal discipline separate from philosophy and 
theology.
Among these enunent philosophers, W olffs oeuvre must be emphasized 
since he, as the leading theoretician of Enlightened Absolutism of the Prussian 
Frederick the Great, considered all kinds of radical attempts to be faulty. In the 
contemporary system o f Enlightened Absolutism these concepts were regarded 
as part of the official legal ideology. W olffs namral law doctrine had a 
profound effect on Hungárián legal philosophy fór over one and a half 
centuries. These popular and respected thoughts have become known as the 
Leibnitz-Wolff school o f namral law.9 The most prominent figure of this 
school, from a Hungárián point of view, was Kari Anton Martini (1726- 
1800),10 who in 1753, being in Mana Theresa’s confidence, was appointed 
professor of the then established department of namral law in Vienna, the 
centre o f the Habsburg Empire. In his works he provided an excellent 
compilation through summarizing the theses of his predecessors (Pufendorf, 
Wolff). In the second half of the 18th cenmry he was considered without a 
doubt as one of the most talented jurists of Austria. Hungary, being part of the 
empire, was nőt independent from Austria in terms o f its economv, politics, or 
culture and science. Consequently, the first attempts to create Hungárián 
theoretical legal thought were connected to the Wolff-Martini doctrines.
9 Ferenc FlNKliY, op. át. (note 1), 126.
10 K a ri A nton MARTINI, Positiones de lege naturali, Viennae, 1767, Budae, 1795; Erklárung dér 
Eehrsat^e über das Naturrecbt, Wien, 1787.
D evelopm en t o f th e  L egal P hilosophical T h ou gh tin  H ungary  273
Further published contemporary works in legal philosophy are regarded as 
siniple explanaűons of thc doctrines of Martini endowed with „Aristotelian 
respect” . Major works were written by Ferenc Roys (1713—1768), György 
Zsigmond Lakits (1739—1814),12 and Adám Brezanóczy (1751—1832).11 It is 
worth mentioning that works opposing the official legal ideology, regarded as 
being of radical attitűdé, were alsó published in the laté 18th centun. As 
examples opposed to Wolff-Martini’s concept, the books written by János Filó 
(1722—1786)14 and János Adámi Nepomuk,15 which include scholastic ethical 
discussions, are worth a mention.
Besides the early products o f the national theoretical literature o f law, the 
importance o f the very frrst work in jurisprudence in the Hungárián language is 
to be emphasized. An extensive volume entiüed Báró Martini természet törvényéről 
való átlátásainak magyarázatja (An explanation to the arguments in the law of 
natúré by Báron Martini) was nothing else bút a translation published in 1792 
o f the second volume o f Martini’s Positiones de lege naturali in Germán, produced 
by Sámuel Dienes,16 who had been a student o f Heidelberg University and was 
then working in the chancellery of the royal court in Transylvania. The name 
of János Újfalusy Nepomuk (1790—1849), who has become a well-known 
phü osopher as an interpreter o f Martini’s doctrines, must alsó be mentioned 
here. His book published under the title A  természeti hármas törvény (The triple 
law of natúré)17 is considered the last one among the works that interpreted 
Martini’s view without any criticism in the Hungárián legal professional 
literature. The reál importance of this work lies in the fact that, besides the 
overwhelming Latin professional literature, it opened the opportunity to 
discuss natural law in the Hungárián language and attempted to introduce the 
discipline intő the Hungárián legal education.18
11 Ferenc ROYS, Ethica et ju s naturae in tisum auditorum pbitosophiae conscripta cum appendice seu 
dissertatione\-\\., Yiennae, 1755, 1761.
12 György Zsigmond LAKITS, Institutio elementoruen juris naturális in usum gymnasiorum et scholarum, 
Budáé, 1778.
"  Adám Brk/.ANÓC/.Y, Explanatio juris naturae, publici universalis etgentium I-II., Posonii, 1795.
11 János FlLÓ , J us naturae pro novello in vinea domini operario deductum ex demonstrato fine bominis, 
Budae, 1781.
13 János AllÁMI, Systema anti-philosophicum de origine ávitatis, Posonii, 1801.
16 Báró M artini természet törvényéről való átlátásainak magyarázatja, melyet német nyelvből mag/arra fordított
és a maga költségén kiadott Dienes Sámuel [An explanation to the arguments in the law o f  natúré by
Báron Martini], Bétsben [Yienna], 1792.
17 N epom uk János Újl'AI.USY, A  természeti hármas törvény [The triple law o f  natúré], Pest, 1825.
18 Publications o f  legal philosophical writings in Hungárián was nőt rare before this time, 
particularlv in the institutions o f  the Reformed church. Evén prior to Újfalusy there had been 
philosophical works o f  law published, such as the textbook in legal philosophy written by
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Fór the monarchs of Enlightened absolutism the doctrines o f State, power 
and law created by Martini were quite acceptable in all respects, and this is why 
it was nőt by chance that natural law doctrines were included as compulsory 
disciplines in the curricula o f legal faculties. These legal philosophical dognias 
allowed the training o f loyal State officers, in addition to supporting further 
extension of the monarchs’ powers. Upon these considerations Mana Therese 
estabhshed -  on the heel o f the examples o f Freiburg (1716) and Prague (1748) 
-  a faculty at the University of Vienna in 1753, and alsó had education in 
natural law fór first-year law students launched in Nagyszombat (Trnava). In 
the first Hungárián faculty of law the professor of Román law was obliged to 
teach this subject, and given a salary nearly double that of of his colleagues. 
The first lecturer meeting the requirements was Mihály Szedmáky in 1761.19
An independent department o f natural law in Nagyszombat had nőt been 
estabhshed until 1770. According to the regulations of the council o f the 
governor-general, „the institutions of Vienna University shall serve as the 
directive rule in every respect”, which means that the institution in Vienna was 
to be used as a model concerning both the course material and the topics fór 
discussion. The regulation clearly defmed which of the works written by 
Martini had to be taught and it alsó emphasized the importance of Grotius’s 
major work.
The first professor of the department of natural law was Johann Heinrich 
Van dér Hayden from the Netherlands, who had graduated from the 
University of Vienna. He was followed by József Fülöp Stuhr (?-?) fór a short 
period of thne. From 1775 natural law was taught by Antal Demién (1744—
1833)20 fór a quarter of a century. According to contemporary records, natural 
law education was nőt highly respected, and few students attended the course. 
It was nőt by chance that the first Ratio Educationis o f 1777 ordered 
departments o f natural law to be estabhshed in further five royal academies of 
law with the aim to change this situation. The monarch made a decision in the 
same year to transfer die seat of the university to the royal palace in Buda, 
which finally moved to Pest (Budapest). In the first half of the 19* century 
Mihály Hirsch (1750-1809)21 and then fór nearly two decades Pál Markovics 
(1758—1832)22 were well-known professors of legal philosophy in university 
education. Their lectures in legal philosophy mainly advocated Martini’s
]ános Sz. Szilág}!, who will be discussed below. This can be considered as the first w ork which 
aimed to estabhsh jurisprudence in the national language as opposed to the Latin language.
19 Tivadar PAULRR, Adalékok a ha^ai jogtudomány történetébe^ [Contributions to the history o f 
Hungárián jurisprudence], Budapest, Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1878, 281.
20 Antal DliMIKN, Dissertatio inauguralis exjure Hungarico de eo, Tyrnaviae, 1776.
21 Mihály HIRSCH, Positiones ex iure digestourm et iure criminali, Tyrnaviae, 1775.
22 Pál MARKOVICS, Praelectiones academicae de iure naturae I-II., Pestini, 1811-12.
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doctrines. Nevertheless, the first representatives of the national discipline of 
philosophy o f law gained distinction in adapting üie generál doctrine o f namral 
law concepts to Hungárián circumstances. The explanation embracing the 
social contract between modern state and law, even through an interpretation 
bv Martini, had the force of revelation m contemporarv Hungary.
3. Kantian legal philosophy
Education based on natural law concepts had become more and more 
anachronistic by the end of the 18th and the early 19th centuries due to the fact 
that these concepts were opposed to the original ideas o f Enlightenment and 
those o f the French Revolution. In the second decade o f the 19th century a new 
concept of philosophy appeared in the Hungárián literature of philosophy. In 
contrast to the conservative legal theory, Kantian philosophy and legal 
doctrines came intő prominence.
The first work to be mentioned in a chronological order is a sum m án in 
Latin by János Sámuel Fuchs (1770—1817)23 and another work, referred to 
above, written by János Sz. Szilágyi (?—1854) in 1813, Oskolai tanító könyv a tétető 
(practica) filosophia második résye: Természeti törvény tudomány (Jus naturae) (The 
second part o f a school textbook in practical philosophy: namral law doctrine), 
which was the first publication to discuss the whole system o f the Kantian 
doctrine in the Hungárián language.24 Other philosophers such as' Zsigmond 
Carlowszky (1772—1821)25 and Mihály Greguss (1793—1838)26 alsó taught 
namral law based on the Kantian concept in the Lutheran College o f Eperjes 
(Presov).
The works published in the first third o f the 19th century, as is true of the 
whole period of the national philosophical thinking, basically served the 
purposes of education in law and partly in philosophy, and were only 
secondarily aimed at the renewal of scientific considerations in the philosophy 
of law. From this point of view, the writing by Mihály Szibenhszt (1783—
23 János Sámuel FUCIIS, Elementajuris naturae, Leutschoviae, 1803.
24 János Sz. SZILÁGYI, Oskolai tanító könyv a tétető (practica) filosophia második résge. Természeti törvény 
tudomány (Jus naturae) vagy: ágon törvényeknek és jussoknak tudományos előadása, meljek a jógán 
okosságból vesgik eredeteket, egyenesen (The second part o f a school textbook in practical 
philosophy: natural law doctrine], Szigeth, 1813.
2;> Zsigmond CARLOWSZKY, Jus naturae [Manuscript, Eperjes 1811], Eperjes, Kollégiumi 
Könyvtár (Librarv o f  Presov College] Fq 532 -  Prot. Kol.
2fl Mihály GREGUSS, A g  ésgjogtudomány esedegőlevele [Letter about natural law] [Manuscript from 
1837], Országos Széchényi Könyvtár: Kézirattár [National Széchényi Library: Archives of 
Manuscript] Quart. Hung. 3652. 8-17.v.
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1834)27 in Latin as a translation of and pardy a commentary on a work by Franz 
Zeiller and Franz Egger,28 professors in Vienna, cannot be regarded as an 
original opus. This work replaced the book by Martini and was used as a 
textbook at the University of Budapest and in the royal academies o f law. The 
main achievement was that it was the first time criticism had been provided on 
Martini’s natural law doctrine in an official textbook. The purposes of 
education were alsó served by a book published in Latin and written by István 
Bánó (?—1862) based on Zeiller, Egger and Szibenliszt.29 Antal Albélyi’s (1794— 
1875) introducdon to the philosophy of law30 and a book by Gyula Gerlóczy 
(1837-1893) based on a work by Antal Bauer were used fór twenty years from 
the early 1860s together with the textbooks by Tivadar Pauler as compulsory 
legal literature/1
Among the contemporary authors of Kantianism, Imre Csatskó (1804— 
1874) professor of the academies o f law in Kassa (Kosice) and Győr, later 
judge o f the royal court, must be mentioned. In his introducdon to natural law 
-  although with strong reference to foreign, mainly Germán professional 
literature (Zeiller, Likawetz, Gross and Krug) -  he created a coherent 
theoretical system. His main work in legal philosophy was published in 1839 
under the üde Bevezetés a természeti jogba és a tiszta általános természeti jog 
(Introducdon to natural law and the pure generál natural law).32 In his work he 
discusses in detail, among other topics, the sources, classificadon, ideas and use 
of natural law, as well as the connection between natural law and related 
principles, and furthermore provides a review of the bibliography of the 
professional literature of that time. He is concerned with the „original” humán 
rights and obligadons.
27 Mihály SziBENLISZT, lnstitutiones iuris naturális I II., Jaunni, 1820-23. See about Szibenliszt’ 
oeuvre: Anna PHTRASOVSXKY, Sjbenlis^t Mihály általános államtana [Mihály Szibenliszt’s generál 
theory o f state], Publicationes Universitatis Miskolcinensis. Sectio Juridica et Politica. Tóm. 
X X V /1 (2007), 121-139.
28 Franz ZEILLER, Franz EGGER, D os natürliche öffentliche Recht I - I I .,  (ien, Triest, Geistinger, 
1809.
29 István BÁNÓ, Etementa jurisprudentiae naturális secundum vestigia celeberrimorum Franc. Nob. de 
Zeiller ac de Egger, aliorumque de jurisprudentia meritissimorum virorum conscripta, Claudiopoli, 1836.
30 Antal ALBÉLYI, Fhilosophiaejurispaecognita, Comaromii, 1831.
31 Gyula G e r l ó c z y , Alkalm azott észjogtan kérdések- és feleletekben-. Dr. Bauer A n ta l jogrendszere 
alapján és több forrás után [Practical natural law: on the basis o f Dr. Antal Bauer], Pest, Emich, 
1862. Revised edition: Terméspetjogtan a vizsgálatra vagy szigorlatra készülők és a művelt rend számára 
I-II. [Studying fór natural law examination], Budapest, M. Kir. Egyetemi Nyomda, 1877/80, 
18832.
32 Im re CSATSKÓ, Bevezetés a természeti jogba és a tiszta általános természeti jog [Introduction to 
natural law and the pure generál natural law], Győr, 1839.
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Due to the book by Csatskó, the Kantian concept gained ground in 
Hungárián legal thinking. The elaboration o f an official legal concept and alsó 
the textbooks used in legal higher education at that time are connected to Antal 
Virozsil (1792—1868), professor of legal philosophy at the faculty of law in 
Budapest. Virozsil can be regarded as a renowned philosopher of law in the 
second third o f the 19th century, whose main merit was that he taught 
philosophy o f law in the Kantian attitűdé at the only university o f Hungary. 
His works were used in legal higher education, in addition to the officiallv 
accepted textbooks by Martini, as handbooks written mostly in Latin or 
Germán. A three-volume book by Virozsil published in 1833 is considered as 
the first original work in the Hungárián philosophy of law.33 However, his main 
work is Epistome juris naturae, seu universae doctrinae juris philosophicae54 the 
Hungárián translation of which was published in 1861.35 Virozsil’s oeuvre is 
characterized by a special contradicdon. Though his theory followed Kantian 
doctrines, including the idea o f freedom, his conclusions adopted a number of 
statements according to absolutist power and the existing status quo. He 
attempted, after the example of the French revolution, to describe all the 
threats that can occur in the establishment and maintenance o f civil order as a 
result o f misinterpreted natural law ideas. This attitűdé appeared in complete 
accordance with the Habsburgs’ striving fór power in the 1830s.
In spite of the fact that Virozsil’s philosophy o f law had a restraimng 
influence, the Habsburg monarchy, after the Hungárián revolution and war of 
independence of 1848-49 was suppressed, decided on further restrictions on 
legal education. In the new curriculum launched in 1855, political powers 
wanted this discipline, aiming to communicate potentially dangerous views to 
be relegated to the background. Instead o f legal philosophy, the history of law 
was emphasized, particularly the teaching o f the history o f Austrian and 
Germán empires and laws. However, in 1860 university autonomy and the 
freedom of education that had been abolished in 1848 was restored. Legal 
philosophical education was then renewed and Germán ceased to be the 
language of instruction.
A prominent philosopher o f neo-absolutism during the two decades after 
the Austro-Hungarian Compromise in 1867 was Tivadar Pauler (1816-1886), 
who is considered as the last significant philosopher o f the Kantian doctrine. 
Pauler became renowned as a professor o f academies o f law in Zagreb and 
Győr, and later as a professor of legal philosophy and criminal law at the
35 A n ta l VIROZSIL, J u s  naturaeprivatum, methodo critica deductum I - I I I .,  P estin i, 1833.
34 A n ta l VIROZSIL, Epistomejuris naturae, seu universae doctrinaejuris philosophicae, Pestini, 1839.
33 Antal VIROZSIL, Egyetemes természet- vagy éssjog elemei I- I I . (trans. József MÁRKI and Pál
Hoi'T'MANN) [Elements o f  generál natural law], Pest, Heckenast, 1861.
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University o f Budapest. Through his works written in Hungárián and 
published beginning in the early 1840s, he became the doyen of Hungárián 
theoretical legal thought by the mid-19^ centur}’. Among his main works the 
first to be mentioned is A-y éstjogtudomány fejlődése s jelen állapotja (The 
development o f the discipline o f natural law and its present status), which was 
published in seven pieces in Tudománytár, the most important scienüfic journal, 
between 1842 and 1843.3f’ In this work Pauler, similarly to Csatskó, determines 
the discipline of philosophy o f law as a major part o f „practical philosophy”, 
which has a profound effect on the legal life of European societies, with 
particular reference to public and priváté law as well as to the reguládon of 
criminal law. In this early work Pauler introduced the history o f theoredcal 
legal thinking starting from Greek philosophy to contemporary trends in 
Hungárián and European legal philosophy. This historical overview was later 
repeated in his book entitled Bevezetés a j és jogtanba (Introduction to natural 
law)3 in 1852 as well as in its further extended publications. In the preface to 
his studv he unambiguously explains his theoretical view, which is based on 
Kantian philosophy. According to his statement about legal order origmating 
from reason independent of anv positive legislation, there exist eternal and 
intangible truths which are assigned as standards in social conditions through 
the order of reason.38
Pauler evolves his views on Kantian philosophy in his work entitled 
É s jogi alaptan (Natural law doctrine)jy in 1854, following his introduction to 
natural law, then in 1864 his monograph És jogi előtan (Natural law studies)40 
was published, which was a combined version of the two previous works.4 In 
the preface to his work he pronounces that „there exist standard and 
unchangeable legal ideas, comprehensible by reason, which create the 
cornerstones fór all societies.”42 Although Pauler followed the Kantian system
36 Tivadar PAULER, / l y  és jogtudomány fejlődése sjelen állapotja (1-7 parts) [Development and actual 
condition o f  natural law theory], Tudománytár 6 (1842/12), 351-371; Tudom ánytár 7 (1843/3), 
188-194; Tudománytár 7 (1843/4), 233-254; Tudománytár 7 (1843/7), 26-49; Tudománytár 7 
(1843/8), 77-94; Tudománytár 7 (1843/9), 147-163; Tudománytár 7 (1843/10), 208-215.
37 Tivadar PAULER, Bevezetés ay és jogtanba [Introduction to natural law], Pest, Emich, 1852.
38 Tivadar PAULER, op. át. (note 36), 6 Tudománytár (1842) 12, 352.
39 Tivadar PAULER, É s jogi alaptan [Natural law doctrine], Pest, 1854.
4I) Tivadar PAULER, É s jog i előtan. A  szerző és jog i bevezetése és alaptana [Natural law studies: 
author’s introduction and doctrine o f natural law], Pest, Athenaeum, 18642, 18733.
41 O ther im portant PAULHR’s legal philosophical studies: A  végsjikségjoga [Law o f  emergencv], 
Új Magyar Múzeum, 3 (1853), 10, 469-478; My elévülés és jog i alapja [Natural law bases o f  lapse], 
M. Akad. Értesítő, 3 (1959), 65-98; A y álladalom jogalapjáról [The legal ground o f the state], M. 
A ka d  Évkönyv, 8 (1860), 30-62; Adalékok a hazai jogtudomány történetéhez [Contributions to the 
history o f  Hungárián jurisprudence] (Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia 1878)
42 PAULER, Bevezetés az és jogtanba, op. át. (note 37) [1873] IV. o.
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when determining the concept o f law, its main idea and the related issues, he 
was nőt a follower without any criticism. Besides describing his counter 
arguments, he included intő his own concept the theses considered acceptable 
by hím. In this way, positive evaluations of the ideas of Ahrens, Stahl, Haller 
and even Hegel occur in his writings.
From the beginnmgs o f the 19th century the attempts of Hungárián legal 
philosophical thinking can be detected in Pauler’s oeuvre, whtch involves a 
move towards legal positivism gaining more and more importance in Western 
Europe. Another special feature of his legal concept is that he tries to combine 
Kantian doctrines with the views o f the historical school of law, which 
emphasizes historical and national traditions. A good example fór this is his 
work büntető jogtan (Criminal law doctrine)43 published in two volumes in the 
mid-1860s, which is considered by most experts to be Pauler’s main work, 
raising the Hungárián criminal law discipline to the academic standards of 
Western Europe.
Having introduced theories and authors closely connected to Kantian 
philosophy, we now turn to the Hungárián translations o f Germán and French 
Hegelian legal philosophical works influencing legal philosophy in Hungary, 
which were used as handbooks in education between the 1850s and 1880s.44 
These are the works by Heinrich Kari Gross, Heinrich Ahrens and J. A. 
Schilling, legal philosophers of Erlangen and Leipzig, which had been 
translated intő Hungárián. The book by Gross was translated by Ágost 
Greguss (1825-1882),45 Ahrens was translated by Ferenc Magyar (1809-1882)46 
and later by Imre Bihari (1829-1882),47 and Schilling’s monograph was 
translated by Rudolf Werner (1838-1907)48 Works created by András Vandrák
43 Tivadar PAULER, büntető jogtan [Criminal law doctrine] I-II (Pest: Pfeiffer 1864-65, 1869- 
18702, 1872-18733)
44 See about this Ferenc FlNKEY, op. át. (note 1) 174.
45 Heinrich Kari GltOSS, Bölcsészeti jogtudomány vagy természetjog (trans. Ágost GREGUSS) 
[Philosophical jurisprudence or natural law], Pest, Heckenast, 1854. Original publication: 
Lebrbucb dérphilosophischen Recbtsivissenscbajt, oder des Naturrecbts, Tübingen, 1802.
46 Heinrich AHRENS, Természeti jog vagy jogphilosophia, e tudomány állása szerint Némethonban (trans. 
Ferenc MAGYAR) [Natural law or legal philosophy: position o f  this discipline in Germánt'], 
Eger: Egri Érseki Főtanodai Könyvnyomda, 1850.
47 Heinrich AHRENS, Természetjog vág jogbölcsészet (trans. Imre BIHARI) [Natural law or legal 
philosophy], Pest, Athenaeum, 1872.
48 J . A . SCHILI.ING, A  természetjog vág bölcsészeti jogtudomány kéjkönyve\ Összehasonlító tekintettel a 
tételesjog intézkedéseire (trans. Rudolf WERNER) [Handbook o f  natural law or legal philosophy], 
Pest, Franklin Társulat, 1869. Further editions: A  bölcsészeti jogtudomány kézikönyve-. Összehasonlító 
tekintettel a tételesjogi intézményekre (trans. Rudolf WERNER) [Handbook o f legal philosophy], 
Budapest, Franklin Társulat, 18742, 18803)
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(1807—1884)49 and Ferenc Thót (1817—?)3" exclusively fór teaching purposes 
must be emphasized, as summaries o f works by Ahrens. The original books 
earlier had had a great influence on Germán, French and Italian legal 
plulosophical thinking, and exerted a similar influence in Hungary as well. 
Hegeüan views were gaining followers, namely the legal philosophical outlines 
by János Warga (1804—1875),31 and the Kantian philosophical essays written by 
Gábor Szeremlei (1807—1867),3~ Nándor Kacziány (1822—1908),53 and László 
Wekerle (1840—?).54
The last original natural law theory, which had been overshadowed by the 
early 19th cenmry, had a major role in legal education as well as in scientific 
works in Hungary, even at the end of the cenmry. Aladár Schnierer (1836— 
1898)55 is considered a delayed representative of Kantian doctrine. Another fact 
to be mentioned is that m 1881, when Ágost Pulszky had lectures in legal 
philosophy in the approach o f legal positivism at the faculty o f law in 
Budapest, a renowned publisher decided to issue a textbook written by an 
author under the pseudonvm „Thomasius” in the spirit of Pauler, fór use by 
students preparing fór examinationsA The last representative of Kantian legal 
philosophy was János Csarada (1850-1923), who lectured in legal philosophy 
at the faculty- of law o f Budapest from the end of the 19th century to 1920, in 
turn with Gyula Pikler, the main figure of the Hungárián sociological legal 
positivism. This fact is proved by a textbook o f university lectures.5' The 
Kantian views introduced by Csarada may have been a highly contrastive 
phenomenon parallel to the concepts o f Pikler. Even in his book published in 
a number of issues entitled A j  ésfjog compendiuma (The compendium of natural 
law) fór those preparing fór examinations as advocates or judges as well as fór
49 András VANDRÁK, bölcseleti jogtan (Esg/og) [Philosophy o f  law: natural law], Eperjes, 
Rosenberg, 1864.
30 Jogbölcsészet. Ahrens H. után hallgatói részére vezérfonalul dolgozta ThÓT Ferencz 
[Philosophy o f  law: on the bases o f  H. Ahrens] (Debrecen 1879)
1,1 János WARGA, A j  ésgjog alapvonatjai [The bases o f  natural law], Tudom ánytár (1834/4), 27- 
46; Tudománytár (1835/5), 83-90; Tudománytár (1835/7), 100-118; Tudománytár (1835/8), 
136-141.
32 G ábor SZERE MLHI, A j  újphilosophia szellemvilági fejletében [Developments o f  new philosophy], 
Pest, 1841; Jogbölcsészet [Philosophy o f  law], Sáros-Patak, Nádaskav, 1849.
33 N ándor KaCXIÁNY, Társadalmi észjog [Social natural law], Budapest, 1873.
34 László W e k e r l e , A j  észjog vezérelvei [Principles o f  natural law], Budapest, Aigner, 1877.
33 Aladár SCI INIKRER, Jogbölcsészeti jegyeit [Lectures on legal philosophy], Budapest, Politzer, 
1898’.
36 TlIOMASIUS, Estjog. Kérdések és feleletekben [Natural law: questions and answers], Budapest, 
Eggenberger, 1881.
37 János CSARADA, A  bölcseleti jog jeg '^getei I-II., [Lectures on philosophical law], Budapest, 
Politzer, 1900.
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practicing lawyers, Csarada explained theoredcal knowledge from an earlier 
standpoint of Kantian philosophy.38
To summarize, it mav be stated that the above mentioned authors and 
works in the Kantian spirit have nőt created a reputable scientific achievement. 
Nevertheless, as opposed to the natural law doctnne o f Wolff-Marüni, these 
philosophers had a modernizing influence in the first third of the 19íh century 
on Hungárián legal thinking, including statutory law disciplines nőt closely 
related to legal philosophy.
4. The historical school of law
The historical school o f law hardly had any influence on legal philosophers in 
Hungary in the first half of the 19th century, a time when it was stronglv 
supported, even by pohtical means in Germany. ' The legal concept of the 
historical school during the Age of Reform is represented only in the oeuvre of 
Ignácz Frank (1788-1850). It was the legal philosophical basis of Hungárián 
priváté law discipline that was mainly influenced by the historical views, which 
resulted in the previously decisive natural law and Kantian doctrine being 
surpassed. Frank, in his És'jogtani vállat (Natural law outline), preserved only in 
manuscript, rejected the then prevailing Martini doctrines, and partly accepted 
Kantian views, e.g., he did nőt trace back humán rights to a natural state, bút to 
the „everlasting, unchangeable source”, and partly adopted the historical legal 
attitűdé that was becommg a decisive factor in Germán legal thinking. By wav 
o f illustration, the right to property, in his view, is nőt derived from natural law 
bút from the statutory legal institutions of nations.6" Later, Frank as a 
contemporary to Friedrich Carl Savigny, became an advocate of the historical 
school of law, emphasizing that Kant’s legal concept is nőt only without reason 
bút alsó a dangerous trend in legal philosophy, consequently, it should be 
abolished and be replaced with Román law in legal education. Regarding his 
view on rejecting codification in law, he appears as an indisputable follower of 
Savigny. Although Frank accepted and advocated the so-called organic theory 
of the formation of law, his theory is free from the national romantic attimde 
highly characteristic fór the Germán historical school of law. It may be stated
38 N. B., A% éstjog compendiuma. A  jogbölcselet történetének rövid vázlata [The compendium o f natural 
law], Budapest, Politzer, 1896, 19002,19043.
5<J Elem ér PÓI.AY, A  pandektisgtika és hatása a magyar magánjog tudományára [The pandectists and 
its influence to the Hungárián civil law], Acta Universitatis Szegediensis de Attila József 
nominatae. Acta Jundica et Politica. Tóm. XXIII. Fasc. 6. (1976), 90 et seq.
60 PAULHR, Adalékok..., op. át. (note 19), 161.
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that Franks’ oeuvre — similarly to the following generation o f Hungárián legal 
philosophers — is nőt to be considered as one of basically legal philosophical 
obligation. These views are revealed in his discussions in statutory law (priváté 
law).
Pál Hoffmann (1830-1907), who published his book entitled A  jog lényege 
(The essence of law)61 in 1864, which included critical remarks on tbe Kantian 
school prevailing in Hungary at that time, and mainly on Pauler’s views, is 
regarded as a follower o f Savigny and the Germán historical school. Reason as 
legal source is considered, in his conception, to be an indispensable means of 
knowledge and to plav an important role in defining the content o f laws; 
nevertheless, no legal content derives from reason itself. In this way, reason is 
a suitable means fór discovering the legal content, bút cannot be considered as 
a reál source of law.
Hoffmann was the first philosopher to propagate the theory o f law of the 
Germán historical school of law as well as the program declaration included in 
Vöm Bentf from Savigny. In his opinion, pursuant to Rudolf Jhering, all views 
that stood in opposidon to Savigny were „mere argumentations” .63 His 
theological views on the genesis of law come from an interpretadon of Georg 
Friedrich Puchta’s views.64 In his discussion on the authority which creates the 
law, a well-known concepdon occurs. Hoffmann uses the concept „nadonal 
spirit” as a synonym to „Volksgeist”, from which, as the main legal source, law 
stems. Law, he concluded from this, has a dual life: „one embodied in the legal 
condidons and the other as an idea in the nation’s consciousness.”6D
Among the most remarkable representatives o f the historical school o f law 
was Gusztáv Wenzel (1812—1891), philosopher, the most eminent student of 
Frank. As a devotee o f the historical school, he held the view that the 
requisites of legal history and legal philosophy interrelated to each other can 
achieve prosperity in jurisprudence/’6 In his writings on legal history and 
comparative law he enthusiastically advocated the views o f Savigny and his 
followers from the mid-19th century. In public opinion WenzePs oeuvre has 
contributed to the full acceptance of the „historical-legal trend” as well as to 
the reviving idea o f nadonal Romanticism in the 1860s and ‘70s. He writes 
about the role of custom in the formádon of law, and about the view saying
61 Pál HOFFMANN, A  jog lényege. Bevezetés a jogtudományba [The substance o f law: introduction to 
the jurisprudence], Pest, Eggenberger, 1864.
62 Op. át. (n o  te 61) 30.
63 PÓI.AY, Apandektisgtika..., op. át. (note 59), 114.
f’4 HOFFMANN, A  jog lényege, op. át. (n o te  61), 8 e t seq.
63 H o f f m a n n ,  A  jog lényege, op. át., 44.
66 Gustáv W e n z e l , A% 1848 előtti magyar magánjog [Hungárián civil law before 1848], Budapest, 
Magyar Királyt Egyetemi Könyvnyomda, 1885, 10-11.
D evelopm en t o f  the L egal P hilosophical Thought in  H ungary  283
that the existing law „stems from the intellectual life of the people”/  He 
accepted the conception of Savigny, „the first legal philosopher o f the éra”/ ’8 
on the issue of organic formádon and development of law, consequendy he 
held a view opposed to codification. Nevertheless, by consciously applying the 
comparadve method, which was rather a particular feature of the historical 
jurisprudence as seen by Maine/’9 Wenzel became the apostie of the developmg 
new discipline in Hungary."
The historical school o f law gained followers mainly among the advocates 
o f the Science o f written law, in the first piacé those of priváté law, and later, 
from the mid-19'h century, among legal h istonans.1 The reason why professors 
o f priváté law were oriented towards the Solutions considercd successful in the 
pást was that civil law efforts failed to achieve codification and the rules of 
customary law proved to be vitai. After the war o f independence was 
suppressed, enthusiasm fór the pást and the „ancient” Hungárián legal 
institutions became an instrument fór preserving the national character. In this 
way the presence o f the historical legal attitűdé was nőt rare in the national 
professional literature even at the turn of the pást century.
5. Positivist legal theory
Towards the turn o f the century the bourgeois ambitions were nőt satisfied any 
longer either by the model of reasonable natural law or classical natural law 
ideas. In the Central-Eastern-European region and alsó in Hungary positivism, 
revealed in evolutionist-reformist explanations and aimed at modelling the 
world o f experience, has gained ground. The attitűdé o f legal positivism came 
intő full power in the Hungárián literature of legal philosophy with the work of
61 Gusztáv WliNZIil., A  magyar magánjog rendszere I [System o f  Hungárián civil law], Pest, 
Athenaeum, 18722, 76; Gusztáv W l i N Z I i l , ^  1848 előtti... ,  op. át. (note 66), 78.
68 Gusztáv WliNZIvl., A g  ausztriai általános polgári törvénykönyv magyarázta [Explanarion of 
Austrian generál civil law code], Bécs, 1854, 4-5.
69 József SZABADFALVI, Historical jurisprudence, avagy a történeti jogtudomány mint a jog 
»kultúrtörténeti« megközelítése [Historical jurisprudence as a „cultural-historical” approach o f  law] 
=  Historical Jurisprudence -  Történeti jogtudomány, ed. József SZABADFALVI, Budapest, 2000, 
14-35.
70 See about this Gusztáv WliNZIil., A g  összehasonlító jogtudomány és a magyar magánjog 
[Comparative law and Hungárián civil law], Budapest, M. Tud Akadémia, 1876.
71 Vilmos PESCHKA, A  magyar magánjogtudomány jogbölcseleti alapjai [Legal philosophical bases of 
science o f  enni law in Hungary], Állam- és Jogtudományi Intézet Értesítője, 2 (1959/1-2), 43- 
44.
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Ágost Pulszky (1846-1901).12 At the beginning of his career he was mainly 
influenced by the English historical school o f law and anthropologist theory, 
which resulted in his translating Henry Maine’s Andent Lm w 1 and he alsó wrote 
— similarly to his contempotary, Friedrick Pollock'4 — over a hundred-page 
notes to the Hungárián edition. His remarkable work dded A  jog és 
állambölcséstget alaptanai (The fundamental doctrine of philosophy of law and 
state) was published in 1885. His book, collection o f university lectures, was 
published in English in London in 1888. ° Pulszky’s achievement is considered 
a milestone in Hungárián scientific life, since his major work established 
ground fór legal posidvism in Hungary. In his posidvist view he accepted „life 
interest”, determining the idea of evoludon, as a driving force as well as 
„theory o f freedom of acdon” reflecdng the classical liberal atdtude to law, 
which claims that the greatest individual freedom, „possibility fór acdng” is to 
be ensured by the State and law. Pulszky in due time realised the importance of 
social, economic and polidcal changes at the end o f the 19th century, and alsó 
their role in the scope of the acdvity o f state. In his view, the increasing role of 
state was mosdy apparent in the changes o f economic conditions, in social 
policy and health service. Clearly perceiving tendencies in the development of 
contemporary capitalism, he outlined the idea o f early social state bevond the 
classical liberal theoretical trend. He alsó paid attention to the conflict of 
narionaüties bevond the boundaries of contemporary' state. His work has 
influenced several branches o f social Science, in this way Pulszky’s oeuvre is 
recognised nőt only by philosophy of law bút by theory of state, politics and 
sociology as well. From the end o f 1880s his active polidcal role turnéd him 
away from Science therefore his life-work is considered incomplete. 
Outstanding representadves o f Hungárián progress after the turn o f the
72 Ágost PlJl-SZKV’s main works o f  legal philosophy: A  jog és állambölcsészet alaptanai [The 
fundamental doctrine o f  philosophy o f  law and state], Budapest, Eggenberger, 1885; Pulszky’s 
other works o f  legal philosophy: A  római jog, s a~ újabbkori jogfejlődés [Román law and modern 
legal development], Pest, Eggengerger, 1869; A ~  angol jogbölcselet történetébey [On history o f 
English legal philosophy], Budapesti Szemle, 7 (1875), 126-148; A  jog és állambölcsészet feladatai 
[The tasks o f  philosophy o f  law and state], Budapest: M. Tud. Akadémia, 1888.
73 Henry MAINE, A  jog őskora, összeköttetése a társadalom alakulásának történetével, s viszonya az újkori 
eszmékhez [Anctent law, its connections with the early history o f  society and its relation to 
m odern ideas], A Magyar Tudományos Akadémia megbízásából fordította, bevezette és 
jegyzetekkel kísérte PUI.SZ.KY Ágost [Ágost Pulszky translated, wrote introduction and notes 
on Hungárián Academy o f Sciences’s authoritv], Budapest, Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 
1875.
74 F ried rick  POLLOCK, Introduction and Notes to S ir Henry Maine’s A ndent Laiv, L o n d o n , M urray , 
1908.
75 Ágost PULS'/.KY, The Theory o f Civil Law and Sodety, London, T. Fisher Unwin, 1888.
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century were among his students, fór example Gyula Pikler and Bódog Somló, 
who later accomplished significant works o f legal philosophy and Oszkár Jászi 
— politician and scientist -  who, as bourgeois radicals, were fighting fór a new, 
modern, 20th century Hungary devoid of any feudal constraints. They believed 
that a wide scope of social, pohtical and legal modernisation can base the 
estabhshment of a Western-European model of evolution.
The positivist doctrine reached the peak of íts history in Hungary at the 
turn of the centuiy by the work o f Gvula Pikler (1864—1937). ’6 He approached 
problems o f State and law from the viewpoint of sociology based on natural 
Sciences. He viewed legal philosophy as the natural Science o f law. Pikler’s 
positivism conforms the theory by Comte, since he treated law as fact of 
society. Herbert Spencer’s influence is revealed in his ideas o f concluding law 
from the evolution laws of society. He believes that people act nőt by instincts 
bút by purposeful discretion (theory of discretion), and according to this, 
people realise and develop norms and institutions satisfying their needs more 
and more perfectly. In this way people establish society, institutions and law 
which are considered rational and purposeful by them. The first ones, who 
recognise purposeful discretion, are the most outstanding members of a 
society, the so called educated classes. From the 1910s Pikler was mainlv 
concerned with biological and psychological reasons behind the phenomena of 
society. Consequently, he became estranged from questions of law and legal 
philosophy, and while changing his fleld o f mterest in Science, he carried out 
experiments in psychophysics and sense physiology. Its consequences were 
mosdy pubhshed in Germán.
6. Neo-Kantian legal philosophy
The period after the turn of the century brought a significant change in the 
history o f both European and Hungárián philosophy o f law. As a result of 
neo-Kantian philosophy having been established on the Continent, the 
traditional approaches of natural law, legal positivism and alsó o f historical 
theory were surpassed. Jurisprudence was seeking new ways emphasising views 
of epistemology, methodology and modern value doctrines. This process in 
Hungárián legal philosophy is connected to the activity of Bódog (Félix) Somló
16 Gyula PlKLIiR’s main works o f  legal philosophy: Bevehető a jogbölcseletbe [Introduction to 
philosophy o f  law], Budapest, Athenaeum, 1892; A g  emberi egyesületek és különösen ag_ állam 
keletkezése és fejlődése [The ongin and development o f humán association and State in particular], 
Budapest, Politzer, 1897; A  jog keletkezéséről és fejlődéséről [About the origin and development o f 
law], Budapest, Politzer, 1897.
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(1873—1920)," whose oeuvre resulted in abolishing the previous falling behind 
in the development and foundation o f neo-Kantian legal philosophy in 
Hungary. s
Somló is regarded as the most well-known representative o f Hungárián 
legal philosophy. His relatively brief career of a quarter o f century is divided 
intő two stages. His studv A  jog értékmérői (V alue standards o f law) published in 
1910 is a work signtng the boundary of a period. The first stage o f his activity 
is viewed as full acceptance and declaration o f Herbert Spencer’s doctrines, 
and he alsó declared Pikler’s theoretical attitűdé based on natural Science and 
psychology79 and partly matenahstic philosophy of history. He focused his 
attention on naturahst sociological problems. During this period Somló 
became, besides Pulszky and Pikler, the dnrd outstanding representative of 
Hungárián positivist philosophy of law. In the second stage of his scientific 
career came the neo-Kantian tűm, which estabhshed the most prospering 
period of Hungárián legal philosophy so far, lastang until the mtddle o f the 
century, until the Marxist theory of law gained ground. While earlier Somló had 
considered legal philosophy and legal sociology as equal, the neo-Kantian 
model caused him to separate these two areas o f the investigation of law. The 
outcomes of this period are his works which founded Somló’s scientific 
reputation as legal philosopher in Hungary' and mainly in German-speaking 
territories. Hungárián jurisprudence can be proud of the fact that Somló, 
besides Rudolf Stammler, Gustav Radbruch, Hans Kelsen and Alfréd Verdross 
is regarded as a great representative of European neo-Kantian philosophy of 
law.
77 Bódog SOMLÓ’s main works o f  legal pliilosophy: Állam i beavatkozás és individualizmus [State 
intervention and individualism], Budapest, Politzer, 1903; jogbölcselet [Philosophy o f law], 
Pozsony, Stampfel, 1901; jogbölcseleti előadások [Lectures on jurisprudence], Kolozsvár, 
Sonnenfeld, 1906; Masstábe zur Bemrtung des Rechts, Archív fik Rechts- und 
W irtschaftsphilosophie 3 (1909-10), 508-522; A  jog értékmérői [Value standards o f  law], 
Huszadik Század 11 (1910), 1-14; Das Wertproblem, Zeitschrift für die philosoplue und 
philosophische Kritik (1912), 66-95; Die Anmndung des Rechts, Zeitschrift für das privát und 
öffentliche Recht dér Gegenwart 38 (1911), 55-74; A  helyes jog elméletéről [O n the theory of 
richtíges Recht], Kolozsvár, Ajtai, 1912-13; Juristische Grundlehre, Leipzig, Yerlag von Félix 
Meiner, 1917. [2. ed: 1927, and reprinted: Aalen: Scientia Verlag 1973]; jogbölcsészet [Legal 
philosophy], Budapest Grill, 1920; Schriften zur Rechtspbilosopbie, Ausgewahlt und eingeleitet von 
Csaba VARGA, Budapest, Akadémia Kiadó,1999.
78 J ózsef SZABADFALVI, The Role of Bódog Somló int the Revival o f Hungárián Legal Philosophy, Archív 
fiir Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie (ARSP) 93 (2007/4), 540-550.
75 Cf. com mon essay o f  Pikler and Somló: Gyula PlKUíR, Bódog SOMLÓ, Dér Ursprung des 
Totemismus. Ein Beitrag zpr materialistishen Geschichtstheorie, Berlin, K. Hoffman, 1909.
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In lus works published around th e tuni o f rhc century, he cnticísed the 
contcmporary „official” scientific ideál from the standpoint o f natural scientific 
positivism and evolutionism. His positivist theoretical attitűdé at that time was 
completed by public-scientific activity. One o f his major works in this period 
was his book titled Állami beavatkozás és individualizmus (State intervención and 
individualism) published in 1930. An increased role o f state along with the 
evolution of monopolist capitaiism of that time demanded a revision of the 
functions and mstitutions of law, state and polidcs. In his Jogbölcselei előadások 
(Lectures on legal philosophy) published in 1906 a large number o f theses 
from his major work Juristische Grundlehre -  although the earlier positivist view 
remains unchanged -  are revealed. By distinguishing pure and applied 
(normative) Sciences, he founded the starting-point o f his neo-Kantian 
philosophy, which is concerned with the investigation of two issues: 1. 
determination of preconditions (concept) of law (basic doctrine of law), 2. 
research of correct law (value doctrine of law). His turn towards neo-Kantian 
philosophy took piacé when dealing with the issue of correct law -  under the 
influence o f Rudolf Stammler -  then it was completed in his comprehensive 
book published in Germán under the title Juristische Grundlehre, m 1917. In 
Somló’s main work, according to contcmporary neo-Kantian philosophy, an 
analytical analysis o f the concept and conceptual elements o f law -  regardless 
its content — is given. He was urged by enthusiastic welcome to his book, to 
investigate the value doctrine of law in a similarly comprehensive way. In order 
to do this, he establish an independent pliilosophical thesis (epistemological 
approach), which was published as posthumous fragments only after his early 
death, in 1926.8"
Somló’s work resulted in propagating the mentaüty o f neo-Kantian 
tendency in legal philosophy in Hungary.81 Somló’s influence can clearly be 
captured in his kindest student’s, G y u l a  Moór’s (1888-1950) activity, who was 
the most recognised Hungárián legal philosopher between the two World 
Wars, professor o f the universities in Szeged and later in Budapest.82 At the
811 Félix SOMLÓ, Príma philosopbia: Gedanken ?u einer erster Pbilosophie, Berlin und Lepzig, Walter de 
Gruyter & Co., 1926,
81 Additional remarkable legal philosopher after the turn o f  the 19th-20th centuries: Gyula 
Teghze (1867—1937), József Hegedűs (1886—?), József Ruber (1890—?)
82 Gyula MOÓR’s main works o f legal philosophy: Stammler,,Helyesjogrólspóló tana" [Stammler’s 
theory o f righteous law], Budapest, Pfeifer, 1911; A  jog jógaima és a~ anarchizmus problémája 
Stammler jogphilosophiájában [The concept o f law and the problem o f anarchism in Stammler’s 
legal philosophy], Athenaeum 20 (1911), 4, 1-35; Macht, Recht, Morál. E in Beitrag -y<r Bestimmung 
des Recbtsbegrijf'es, Szeged: Szeged Városi Nyomda, 1922; Bevezetés a jogftlozpj'iába [Introduction to 
legal philosophy], Budapest, Pfeifer, 1923; Das Logiscbe im Recht, Internationale Zeitschrift für 
Theorie des Rechts 2 (1927-28/3), 157-203; Zum eivigen Frieden. Grundríss einer Pbilosophie des
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beginning o f the 1920s Barna Horváth called Moór the founder o f a „new 
Hungárián legal philosophy”. Moór created something new in his 
comprehensive attitűdé, which was by somé critics called, nőt without reason, 
an eclectic thcory.
Being attached to neo-Kantian philosophy o f law, Moór was mainly 
influenced by Stammler and Somló. Kelsen’s theory must alsó be mentioned as 
a permanent base of comparison to Somló’s philosophy o f law even if they 
often had divergent views.83 When forming his own philosophical system, 
Moór is characterised by a complex approach to the problems raised by his 
philosophical and legal philosophical antecedents that exerted influence on 
hím. In his fírst comprehensive work published in 1923 he mentions three 
independent fields o f investigation: 1. definition o f the concept of law 
(fundamental doctrine o f law), 2. scientific investigation of generál causality in 
law (sociology o f law) 3. the question o f correctness o f law (value doctrine or 
legal axiology). In this basic work he worded the ‘methodology of statutory 
law’ as the fourth tieid o f legal philosophy in a wider sense.
From the laté 1920s on Moór wanted to elaborate his legal philosophical 
system on the basis of paradigms of „Baden” or „value doctrine school” 
represented by Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert, seeking new paths 
in neo-Kantian philosophy. Meanwhile Moór was seeking connection between
Pa^ifismus und des Anarchizmus, Leipzig, Verlag von Félix Mainer, 1930; A  jogi személyek elmélete 
[Theory o f  legal persons], Budapest, Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1931; Reine Rechtslehre, 
Naturrecht und Rechtspositivi^uus - Gesellschaft, Staat und Recht. Festschnft gewidmet Hans 
Kelsen zum 50. Geburtstag, Wien: Verlag von Julius Spnnger, 1931, 58-105; Creazjone e 
applicazione dél diritto, Rivista Internationale di Filosofia dél D iritto 14 (1934), 653-680; Das 
Problem des Naturrecbts, Archív fúr Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 28 (1935/3), 325-347; 
Szociológia és jogbölcselet [Sociology and legal philosophy], Budapest, Királyi Magyar Egyetemi 
Nyomda, 1934; Jogftlozpjia [Philosophy o f  law], Budapest, Magyar Elet, 1936; Dér Wissenschafts- 
Cbarakter dér jurisprudenz, Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 20 (1940/1), 20-37; A  jog mivolta az 
újabb kultúrfilozpfia megvilágításában [Tire natúré o f  law in the líght o f  the new philosophy o f 
culture], Athenaeum, 28 (1942/3), 237-252; Recht und Gesellschaft, Zeitschrift für öffentliches 
Recht, 21 (1942/5), 537-567; Was ist Rechtspbilosophie?, Archív für Rechts- und
Sozialphilosophie 37 (1943), 3-49; Ujkantiánizmus és újbegeliánizmus a jogfilozófiában [Neo- 
Kantianism and neo-Hegelianism in legal philosophy], Magyar Jogi Szemle (1943/3), 71-85; A  
jogbölcselet problémái [Problems o f  legal philosophy], Budapest, Magyar Szemle Társaság, 1945; 
Tegnap és holnap között [Between yesterday and tomorrow], Budapest, Révai, 1947; Schrijten y//r 
Recbtsphilosophie, Herausgegeben mit Bio- und Bibliographie versehen von Csaba VARGA, 
Budapest, Szent István Társulat, 2006.
83 Cf. József SZABADFALVI, Egy kortárs magyar jogfilozófus reflexiói — Moór Gyula Kelsen-interpretációja 
[Reflecdons o f  a contemporarv Plungarian legal philosopher — Gyula M oór’s Kelsen- 
interpretation] = Hans Kelsen jogtudománya. Tanulmányok Hans Kelsenről, ed. CS. KISS 
Lajos, Budapest, G ondolat Kiadó -  MTA Jogtudományi Intézet - ELTE Állam- és 
Jogtudományi Kar, 2007, 747-761.
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the worid o f reality (Sein) and that o f value (Sollen) — which as the central 
problem of neo-Kanttan legal philosophy -  instead of strictly separating the 
two spheres as somé thinkers did by stating an antagonism between them. 
Consequently, he interpreted law as phenomenon belonging to the realm of 
„reality o f values” . In the 1930s he thought he could mosdy rely on Heinrich 
Rickert’s philosophy, bút then at the beginning of the 1940s he turnéd to neo- 
Hegehan philosophical theses of Nicolai Hartmann. In the works published in 
the early 1940s he saw the opportunity to renew the philosophy of law in a 
„new tendency o f cultural philosophy” , which was a sort of synthesis of neo- 
Kantian and neo-Hegelian philosophical thoughts. In consequence, he sees in 
law nőt only a system of statutes containing abstract regulations bút alsó the 
realities of humán activities in which the intellectual content o f law becomes 
reahty. It is regrettable that because o f the war and the years o f upheaval 
following it, he had no opportunity to elaborate his system of legal philosophy 
based on new philosophical ideas. The most everlasting and alsó the most cited 
part of Moór’s work is the investigation o f the concept o f law. It is the issue 
that brought his teacher’s, Somló’s most considerable influence. Among 
abundant theories of power and force, Moór carried out a sophisticated 
investigation o f the concept of law by transferring the idea o f social reahty to 
the realm of law and thus he opened up new possibihties fór the investigation 
of characteristic features of the régimé behind law.
From the early 1930s, in the prevailing neo-ICantian philosophy Barna 
Horváth (1896-1973) created a new colour in the Hungárián traditions o f legal 
philosophy.84 His career was first promoted by Moór in the 1920s and then 
became famous as professor of Szeged University, In his view o f legal theory, 
which he preferred calling legal sociology or even „pure legal sociology”
84 Barna HORVÁTH’s main works o f  legal philosophy: Die Idee dér Gerecbtigkeit, Zeitschrift für 
öffentliches Recht 7 (1928), 508-544; Természetjog és pozitivizmus [Natural law and positm sm ], 
Társadalomtudomány 8 (1928), 212-247; Gerecbtigkeit und Wabrbeit, Internationale Zeitschrift für 
Theorie des Rechts 4 (1929), 1-54; Hegei und das Recht, Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 12 
(1932), 52-89; Bevezetés a jogtudományba [Introduction to legal scholarship], Szeged, Szeged 
Városi Nyomda és Könyvkiadó Rt., 1932; Rechtssozioiogie: Prob/eme des Geselschaftslehre und dér 
Geschicbtslehre des Recht, Berlin-Grunewald, Verlag für Staatswissenschaften und Geschichte 
G.m.b.H., 1934; Sociologie juridique et Théorie ProcessueUe du droit, Archives de Philosophie du droit 
et de Sociologie Juridique 5 (1935), 181-242; Macht, Recht, Verfahren, Archív für Rechts- und 
Sozialphilosophie 30 (1936), 67-85; M jogelmélet vázlata [Outlines o f  legal theory], Szeged, 
Szeged Városi Nyom da és Könyvkiadó Rt., 1937; Dér Sinn dér Htopie, Zeitschrift für 
öffentliches Recht’ 20 (1940/2), 198-230; Prolegomena zur Sozjologie, Archív für Rechts- und 
Sozialphilosophie 37 (1943), 50-67; Angol jogelmélet [English legal theory], Budapest, Magyar 
Tudományos Akadémia, 1943; Tieid L a tv  and Lm ív  Tieid, Österreichische Zeitschrift für 
öffentliches Recht 8 (1957/1), 44-81; The Base of L a w  /  A  jog alapjai, ed. Csaba VARGA, 
Budapest, Szent István Társulat, 2006.
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according to Kelsen’s terminology, his originality was mainly revealed in his so 
called synoptic attitűdé and the functionally related processional legal view. He 
has created something new by conforming two paradigms that were considered 
antagonisric in contemporary legal philosophy. A parallel existence of neo- 
Kantian (Lask, Rickert, Verdross, Kelsen, etc.) and pragmadc-empirical 
attitudes (Pound, American realism, etc.) and their relarion to each other was 
regarded as a break-thorough nőt onlv in Hungárián bút alsó in European legal 
thinking. The consideration o f these two influential paradigms is nőt by 
chance. While between the two World Wars neo-Kantian paradigm is to be 
considered evident in Middle Europe, pragmatism appeared as a new idea 
mainly in the Hungárián public view of legal philosophy. Horváth’s 
susceptibility to empiricism can be attributed to two reasons. On one hand, he 
as practising lawyer realised contradictaons in norms and reality, which was 
neglected by neo-Kandan philosophy. On the other hand, during his journev 
to England in the laté 1920s, Anglo-Saxon legal culture made a great impact on 
him.
The synopdc method elaborated by Horváth is an original interpretadon 
of one of the fundamental questions of neo-Kantian legal philosophy, namely 
the connection between value and reality. The most significant representadves 
of „contemporary” Hungárián philosophy of law, including Moór, Somló and 
Horváth, all concerned themselves with finding a soludon to this problem. 
Horváth’s starting point was the essence of legal acdvrty, and consrdered law as 
a pattern o f thoughts in a judge’s mind, which is nothing else in this way bút a 
„reflexive theoretical product”. The procedure by a lawyer becomes synopdc 
through his applying a legal case to a legal norm, and at the same tinié, vica 
versa, relating a legal norm to a legal case. The lawyer, therefore, relates 
normadve matters of fact to reál matters of fact. In order to do this job, the 
lawyer needs a knowledge of facts selected according to legal rules, and alsó a 
knowledge of laws selected according to matters of fact. While a practising 
lawyer focuses his attention mainly on a legal case, a theoretical lawyer 
concentrates on statutes o f law, bút both consider the legal case and the law at 
the same time.
According to Horváth’s processional legal attitűdé, closely related to his 
synoptic method, law cannot simply be regarded as norm bút as an abstract 
behavioural pattern and relating actual behaviour, or in other words, a 
connection between norm and behaviour, which is the procedure itself. 
Procedure is the „genus proximum” of law. That is to say, a continuous 
relation (of synoptic structure) of a legal case to the legal norm will create a 
procedúrái process. In Horváth’s opinion, law as the most developed social
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procedure establishes the most advanced stage of procedures by establishing 
the most developed procedúrái institution.
Horváth’s role hes in the fact that traditional German-Austrian ties o f the 
20th century neo-Kantian Hungárián legal philosophical thoughts were 
„tailored” by him through transferrmg Anglo-Saxon theories of junsprudence 
and created new perspectives fór further development in Hungárián legal 
theory. Regretfully, the Second World War and the following polttical changes 
forced him to emigrate in 1949 and there he did nőt have the opportunity to 
continue developing his theory.
7. Criticism of the neo-Kantian paradigm
From the laté 1930s we can see attempts by a new and lnghly talented 
generation, mostly by the students of Moór and Horvátit. The first 
pubhcations by Moór’s students József Szabó and by Horváth’s students István 
Bibó, Tibor Vas are considered as attempts to definitely discredit the neo- 
Kantian paradigm.85
József Szabó (1909-1992)86 graduated from the faculty of law at the 
University o f Szeged and he was a student o f Moór, an outstanding legal 
philosopher of neo-Kantian philosophy in the inter-war penod. Szabó was a 
prominent representative o f the gifted and promising generation, who achieved 
bnlliant careers during the Second World War, and who were involved in the 
intellectual and scientific renewal of the country after the war. After graduation 
he became acquainted with Horváth, founder of school and an exceptional 
personahty o f Hungárián legal philosophy. Horváth’s personality and his legal 
philosophical approach representing the mfluence o f Anglo-Saxon 
jurisprudence and legal culture gave rise to Szabó’s enthusiasm. It was the 
period in the Hungárián legal philosophical thinking when, besides the 
achievements of Austrian, Germán and French legal philosophy, those of 
English and American jurisprudence were alsó considered. Apart from this,
s5 Die Schule von Szeged. Recbtspbi/osopbische Aufsdtge von István Bibó, József Sgabó und Tibor Vas, 
Herausgegeben mit Bio- und Bibhographie versehen von Csaba VARGA, Budapest, Szent 
István Társulat, 2006.
86 József SZABÓ’s main works o f  legal philosophy: A  jog alapjai [The bases o f law], Budapest, 
Magyar Társadalomtudományi Társulat, 1938; A  jogáspi gondolkodás b'olcselete [Philosophy of 
juristic thinking], Szeged, 1941; H ol a% igagság? A  bírói lélektan problémái [Where is the truth? 
Psychological problems faced by judge], Társadalomtudomány 22 (1942/1), 1-55; Wabrheit, 
IVert und Symbol im Recb/e, Archív für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 37 (1943), 101-121; Dér 
Recbtsbegriff in einer neurealistischen Beleuchtung, Österreíchische Zeitschríft fúr öffenliches Recht 1 
(1948/3), 291-331.
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Alfréd Verdross, professor of intemational law and legal philosophy at the 
University o f Vienna gready influenced hím, and they became friends fór life. 
S2abó’s papers were frequendy published in the Österreichiscbe Zeitschrift Jiir 
öffentliches Recbt, a journal edited by Verdross
As a result of Horváth’s aim to establish a school, the „school o f Szeged” 
was founded, and it included, besides Szabó, István Bibó, who later abandoned 
legal philosophy, and alsó Tibor Vas,87 who became Marxist in the 1950s and 
renounced the mentality o f the school. Szabó’s legal philosophical thinking 
bears the strongest marks o f the master’s irradiative influence. He began to 
elaborate his independent legal philosophical doctrine in the laté 1930s. He was 
alsó deeply involved in issues on constitutional and international laws.
In his writings on legal philosophy Szabó attempts to discredit the neo- 
Kantian model by using the outcomes o f criticism, according to Dávid Hume, 
and the American legal realism. Szabó, in his works published in the earlv 
1940s, attempted to create a „neo-realistic” approach to the concept o f law. 
Applying the method common in Anglo-Saxon professional literature, he 
modelled the essence of legal thinking with describing legal cases. With this 
kind o f approach, he seemed to discover a number o f similar features between 
English and Hungárián „traditional” legal attitudes. Citing the ideas o f Jerome 
Frank, Edward Robinson and Thurman Arnold, the most outstanding 
personalities o f American legal realism, Szabó abandoned belief in legal 
security, which was, in his opinion, revived by a faulty logical philosophy of 
law. In his theory he alsó used Frank’s doctrine of „fact-sceptács” and „rule- 
scepdcs”. Szabó claimed that in law enforcement it is nőt merely the legal 
norms one is to consider when looking fór justice, since the statement of facts 
is as important a precondition fór a righteous judgement as the interpretation 
o f the corresponding law. He believed that legal decisions are influenced by 
„psychological circumstances”.
When reading Szabó’s works, one can clearly perceive the ideas of 
American legal realism. At that time, in the early 1940s, this kind of theory was 
considered rather exceptional in the Hungárián literature o f legal philosophy. 
The influence exerted by the classical representatives of legal realism is 
undeniable. When appreciating Szabó’s work one can suggest that, in a similar 
way to the evaluation o f Horváth’s work, he alsó gave particular pragmatic 
explanations to the classical neo-Kantian problems. Doing so, he created the 
possibility fór a prohfic interrelation of two legal culmres, and abolished the
87 Tibor VAS’s (1911-1983) main works o f  legal philosophy: Die Bedeutung dér transzendentalen 
bogik in dér Recbtspbilosophie, Szeged, Szegedi Városi Nyomda és Könyvkiadó Rt., 1935; A  tiszta 
jogtan és a szemléleti jogelmélet [The pure theory o f  law and the synoptic legal theory], Kecskemét, 
Szellem és Élet, 1937.
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previous one-sided Austrian and Germán orientation in the Hungárián legal 
philosophical thinking. This is considered very important even if we sometimes 
come across rather eclectic explanations. Neither the master nor his student is 
an exception to this. Regretfully, however, Szabó was nőt able to work out 
further systematic explanations to his theory of legal philosophy called „neo- 
realistic” .
István Bibó (1911-1979) graduated as a Horváth’s student -  a 
representative figure o f Hungárián neo-Kantian legal philosophy — from the 
faculty of law at the University o f Szeged. Bibó was a prominent representative 
of the generation, who had a successful career during World War II and the 
subsequent period, and he was involved in the intellectual and scientific 
renewal o f the country after the war.
Bibó, as a law student and then as a member of the „school of Szeged” 
established by his one-time professor, was concerned with legal philosophy 
and issues o f international law. In the early 1930s he visited, on several 
occasions, the university of Vienna where he listened to lectures delivered by 
Alfréd Verdross, Adolf Merkl and Félix Kaufmann, and later he, as student of 
the Institut des Hautes Etudes Internationales in Geneva, became acquainted 
with Hans Kelsen, Paul Guggenheim, Maurice Bourquin and Guglielmo 
Ferrero. Subsequent to his study trip in Switzerland, he translated, with the 
approval of the author, Kelsen’s work tided Reine Rechtslehre intő Hungárián.88
With the aim of working out his own system of legal philosophy, he 
published his work under the tide Kényszer, jog, szabadság (Compulsion, law, 
liberty)89 in 1935. He started to elaborate his own theory with thoroughness 
and moderation contrary to his age. From the starting point o f the neo- 
Kantian paradigm, Bibó examined the functional link between constraint, 
liberty and law, and completed this with Henry Bergson’s thoughts on 
spontaneity as well as with Nicolai Hartmann’s theses on ontology and ethics. 
One o f the cornerstones of his theory' was his independent criticism o f 
Kelsen’s doctrine and that o f Horváth’s legal attitűdé. Nevertheless, Bibó 
considered his master’s „synoptic” method suitable fór solving the essential 
neo-Kantian problem, the contradiction between „Sein” and „Sollen”, in which 
the law of spontaneity plays a major role. Besides this, he borrows his one-time 
professor’s idea of objectivism, which he uses as a key concept in his doctrine.
Bibó claims that there exists a certain balance o f the elements of 
constraint and freedom in the experimental material of law. As a result o f the
88 Hans KELSEN, Tiszta jogtan [Reine Rechtslehre, 1934], trans. István B ibó, Budapest: ELTE 
Bibó István Szakkollégium, 1988.
89 István BlBÓ, Kényszer, jog, szabadság [Compulsion, law, liberty], Szeged, Szegedi Városi 
Nyomda és Könyvkiadó Rt., 1935.
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old lcgal philosophical debate on constraint, Bibó claims that the essence of 
law is to be found in constraint, either phvsical or intellectual. In his argument, 
it is the degree o f objectivity that makes the legal sancdon different from 
sancüons of other social norms. An essendal thesis of his, saying that law is 
considered as one o f the most objective constraints, is based on this approach. 
The other key paradigm of his legal philosophy declares that law is to be 
viewed as the most essendal tool of ensuring humán freedom, since the area 
left free from constraint is „the realm of the most objective freedom”. 
According to his comprehensive definition, law provides the most objective 
constraint parallel with the most objective freedom. Completing his frequently 
cited thesis on the Janus-faced law, Bibó argued that the reál power o f law is 
ensured bv this dual tension, and this fact makes law different from all other 
social rules.
In the second half o f the 1930s Bibó attempted to describe certain issues 
o f legal philosophy. His problem-raising appeared as criticism o f Kelsen’s 
theory, which exerted an effect o f revelation at that time.90 In tltis latter work 
he attempted to ftnd new paths in elaborating his legal philosophy by 
extending and making radical changes in his one-time professor’s synoptic 
doctrine. Regrettably, from the early 1940s Bibó abandoned legal philosophy 
and became more and more deeply involved in issues o f political Sciences and 
historical philosophy.91
They represent a new generation, who had the opportunity to make 
Hungárián legal philosophy a part o f European standard in the international 
culture o f legal pltilosophy so as to make it conform challenges of the penod 
after World War II, since they had a comprehensive knowledge o f Germán 
junsprudence, o f English-American, French, etc. literature and they could alsó 
improve their predecessors’ professional connections abroad. However, this 
„challenge” was turnéd to a different direction as a result o f the widely known
,J0 See István BIBÓ, Le dogme dn »bellumjustum« et la theorie de l'infaillibiUtéjuridique: Essai critique sur 
la théorie pure du droit, Revue Internationale de la Theorie du D roit 10 (1936/1), 14-27; 
Recbtskraft, rechtliche Unfehíbarkeit, Souveránitat, Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht, 17 (1937/5), 
623-638.
,;l The name o f István Losonczy (1908—1980) must be mentioned in this time, who bean his 
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o f  law in the 1940s. See István LOSONCZY, L)bér die Möglichkeit und den Wissenschaftscharakter dér 
Rechtswisswnschaft, Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 17 (1937/2), 145-194; A. funkcionális 
fogalomalkotás lehetősége a jogtudományban [The feasibility o f  functional concept-building in 
jurisprudence], Budapest, Királyi Magyar Egyetemi Nyomda, 1941; Losoncig István egyetemi tanár 
Jogjilogófiai előadásainak váplata [The outlines o f  Professor István Losonczy’s lectures on legal 
philosophy], Pécs 1948; LOSONC'/.V István, Jogfilopófiai előadások [Lectures on legal philosophy], 
Budapest, Szent István Társulat, 2002; AbriJS eines realistischen recbtspbilosophischen System, 
Budapest, Szent István Társulat, 2002.
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political events in Central-Eastern Europe. The left-wing (communist) 
overtake of power in Hungary in 1948/49 hampered nőt only poliücal, 
economic and cultural boom after the war, consequendy obstructing the 
establishment of tlie Western-European model of development, bút -  as \ve 
could realise later — resulted in a four-decade detour in the evolution of 
Hungárián legal philosophy.
*  *  *
The final „attempt” was made by Imre Szabó’s volume A  burásod állam- és 
jogbölcselet Magyarorsgágott (The bourgeois philosophy o f State and law in 
Hungary) published in 1955/2 In this work, which mostly provides demagogue 
Marxist criücism o f Hungárián „bourgeois” legal philosophy claiming that it 
was reactionary, extremist, ideological and supportive to the current régime. He 
accepts only somé of the finds of positivist legal attitűdé at the turn o f the 
century, which declared the idea of bourgeois radicalism and thus suggested a 
„Progressive” view close to historical materialism. This „critical” approach as a 
result o f the mentality o f eláss fight have determined the dogmatic starting 
points fór about thirty years whose acceptance has only provided access to the 
ab öve mentioned authors and their theones. Marxist legal theory o f the Soviet 
type was nőt concerned with traditions, which was regarded as valueless. In the 
second edition of his work in 1980 Imre Szabó confirmed his previous 
statements, moreover he was even more confirmed m his views as a result of 
the pást decades/3
The mid-1980s signalled the revival of Hungárián legal philosophy. By this 
tirne the Soviet type Marxism has lost ground in legal philosophical literature. 
Further confirmation of the previously unquestionable paradigms have nőt pút 
researchers’ existence intő risk any longer. Fór jurists concerned with legal 
theory, it was only a choice of values to decide which paradigm would be 
fundamental fór them. One of the forms of finding new ways was provided by 
studies in Hungárián traditions o f legal philosophy before the year o f change, 
which were carried out by the concerned researchers still alive and the younger 
generations who view this kind o f tradition as a neglected value and take 
responsibility fór the rehabilitation of their predecessors’ work.
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